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Murthy: Preliminary Injunctions in Trade Secrets

COMMENT
PUBLIC CONCERN - A
"NEWSWORTHY" EXCEPTION TO
THE GRANT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS IN TRADE
SECRET CASES
INTRODUCTION

Apple iPods are the apple of everyone's eyes. The spectacular
success of the iPod has spawned web sites devoted solely to Apple
products and supporting software. 1 These web sites provide all the
information that Apple neophytes and dedicated Apple geeks need?
However, in recent times, these websites that are a source for all things
Apple, have locked horns with the company over certain articles written
before the release of new products. 3
The timing of the release and the features of the products are often
1 See,
e.g.,
ThinkSecret,
http://www.thinksecret.com.
The
Mac
Observer,
http://www.themacobserver.com,
O'Grady's
Power
Page,
http://www.powerpage.com,
MacRumors.com,
http://www.macrumors.com.
The
iPod
Observer,
http://www.theipodobserver.com, MacBytes.com, http://www.macbytes.com (last visited Oct. 28,
2(05). These websites publish articles primarily on the topic of Apple computers and products. They
also publish articles about non-Apple products designed to interoperate with Apple products.
2 1d.

3 See Complaint, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Does, No. 1-04-CV-032178 (Santa Clara County
available
at
Superior
Court
filed
on
Dec.
23,
2004),
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Apple_v_Does/Complaint.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Apple Does, Complaint]; Complaint for Trade Secret Misappropriation, Tortious
Interference with Contract and Breach of Contract Apple Computer, Inc. v. Nick dePlume, et. ai, No.
I-OS-CV -033341 (Santa Clara County Superior Court filed on Jan 4, 2005), available at
http://www.homepage.mac.com/jharrelllApple%20v.%20dePlume.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter ThinkSecret, Complaint].
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carefully guarded trade secrets.4 Apple's strategy is to maximize the
publicity of new products without denting the demand for the older
versions. 5 Although not as significant as a Time magazine cover, these
websites playa major role in popularizing Apple's products. 6 However,
these web sites struck a dissonant tune with Apple by prematurely posting
future product information. 7 Consequently, Apple filed a lawsuit against
these websites for misappropriation of its trade secrets. 8
Before the advent of the Internet, trade secret holders such as Apple
were not pressured to pursue third party publishers9 because of the
publishers' practical inability to destroy the trade secret. 10 The
publication was constrained by the limitations of the medium of
publication, which did not have the reach or the speed of the Internet. ll
Moreover, competitors often have the same interest in preserving the
secrecy of a trade secret as the original holder of the information. 12
Hence, mass dissemination by another was not a realistic threat. 13
In general, a trade secret loses all protection when it is no longer a
secret or it becomes generally known. 14 Therefore, the Internet has
multiplied the risk of loss of a trade secret. 15 Third party publishers now

See Apple Does, Complaint at 3; ThinkSecret, Complaint at 5.
See ThinkSecret, Complaint at 6.
6 See Defendant the dePlume Organizations LLC's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Special Motion to Strike Complaint Pursuant to California Anti-SLAPP Statute, Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Nick deplume, et. ai, No. 1-05-CV-033341 (Santa Clara County Superior Court
filed on March 4, 2005), available at http://www.thinksecret.com/filings/antislapmemorandum.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2005) [hereinafter ThinkSecret, Anti-SlAPP Memorandum of Points and
Authorities] ThinkSecret delivers approximately 2.5 million page views a month and publishes on an
average 13 articles a month. ThinkSecret, Anti-SlAPP Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
supra note 5, at 2.
7 See Apple Does, Complaint, supra note 3, at I; ThinkSecret, Complaint, supra note 3, at 2.
8 See id.
4

5

9 See Eugene Volokh, Essay: Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
after Eldred, Liquamart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 697, 739 (2003).
10 See David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment and the Challenges of the Internet
Age, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 537, 556 (2001)
II [d.

12 See Pamela Samuelson, Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First
Amendment,
(Mar.
23,
2003)
(unpublished
"manuscript",
available
at:
http:/www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pamlpapersITS%201st%20A%203%d20dr.pdf (last visited Oct. 24,
2005.)
13 Id.
14 See generally Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(holding that trade secret loses all protection when it is published on the Internet unless the
publication was an obscure site with limited viewers); See also Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trade Secrets
in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. TIl. L. Rev. liS 1, 1152
(1996).
15 See Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trade Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law
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have the power to instantaneously disseminate the information globally
and destroy a trade secret. 16 In addition, trade secret owners have to deal
with a new class of misappropriators - websites and web users. I?
Trade secret law permits trade secret holders to seek injunctions and
damages against misappropriators. 18 The challenges posed by the
Internet may justify imposing injunctions on publication of trade secrets
to protect investment in research and development, as in Apple's case. 19
However, injunctions are a form of prior restraint. 20 When granted
against third party publishers who have no obligation to keep the
information secret, injunctions prohibiting publication violate these
publishers' First Amendment rightS?1 In addition, injunctions enable the
trade secret holder to suppress information affecting the welfare of the
public, under the guise of trade secrets. 22
The public has no legal right to access the trade secret under any
circumstances because disclosure of a trade secret destroys its value. 23
But, injunctions against third party disclosures of trade secrets adversely
affect the welfare of the public by blocking a source of information and
thereby stifling comment, criticism, and discussion?4 Therefore, the
economic interests of trade secret holders must be weighed against the
public necessity for disclosure and the First Amendment rights of third
Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (1996).
16 See Uf. at 1153.
17
1d.
18 CAL. Crv. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 2005). Actual or threatened misappropriation may be
enjoined. Id.
19 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Does, No. 1-04-CV -032178 (Superior Court Santa Clara
County,
March
II,
2005)
available
at
http://www.eff.orglCensorship/
Apple_v_Doesl20050311_apple_decision.pdf (last visited October 28, 2005) [hereinafter Judge
Kleinberg, March II, 2005, Order after Hearing.]
20 The clearest definition of prior restraint is an administrative system or judicial order that
prevents speech from occurring. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 938 (Aspen Law &
Business 2001). See also Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 549 (1993) (stating that the term
prior restraint is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communication are to occur).
21 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 741 (2003).
22 1d. at 746.
23 See, e.g. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. NetCom On-Line Comm'c Services, Inc., 923 FSupp.
1231, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 FSupp 1519 (D. Colo.
1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995), DVD Copy Control
Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69, 84 (2003) (holding that disclosure of trade secret on the Internet
destroyed its status as trade secret because the information became generally known due to
publication).
24 See generally David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment and the Challenges of
the Internet Age, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 537 (2001) (arguing that the public will be served
by affirming the publisher's First Amendment right, not restricting them even when they post trade
secrets on the Internet).
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party publishers to publish the information.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of various
provisions of California's trade secret law, the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act ("UTSA,,)?5 Part II analyzes the various categories of trade secret
users who may become liable for unauthorized publication of a trade
secret. 26 Part ill examines the distinct approaches of the United States
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court in granting preliminary
injunctions against third party publication of confidential information. 27
Part IV identifies the features of a newsworthy- public-concern exception
to the grant of preliminary injunctions against third party publishers in
trade secret cases?8 Part V provides justification for the recognition of a
newsworthy- public-concern exception. 29
Finally, this Comment
concludes that in cases involving third party publication of information
that would be prima facie trade secrets, courts should be more
circumspect in granting preliminary injunctions when the information is
newsworthy and relates to a matter of public concem. 30
I.

BACKGROUND

UTSA defines trade secret as "information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process,
that: (1) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy. ,,31
Thus, under the UTSA, a trade secret encompasses anything of
competitive value not generally known in a specific trade. 32 The
sweeping coverage of eligible subject matter is coupled with the right to

See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37 -51 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 53 -128 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 129 -193 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 194-252 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 253-264 and accompanying text.
31 CAL.CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2005). The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1979. See Atkins, supra note 15, at
1157 (1996). Rather than changing the trade secret law, the UTSA drafters intended to codify
existing standards and to promote uniformity in trade secret misappropriation standards. [d. See
also Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corporation. 29 Cal.4th 215, 221 (2002). California
has adopted without significant change the Uniform Trade Secrets. [d. [Henceforth all references to
trade secret law imply UTSAj.
32 See Atkins, supra note 15, at 1157 (1996).
25

26
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keep the information secret indefinitely.33 In addition, the law provides
for injunctions and damages in case of unauthorized publication of trade
secrets. 34
The rationale for imposing injunctions and damages for the
disclosure of, for instance, Apple's trade secrets is supported by core
public policies - maintaining commercial morality, to encourage
research by ensuring that innovators benefit from their inventions and
investments, and to punish industrial espionage. 35 But the efficacy of
injunctions imposed against a third party publisher for disclosing such
information must be examined in the light of First Amendment rights of
publishers and public concem. 36
II.

THE UTSA AND LIABILITY FOR DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRETS

Under the UTSA, once information qualifies as a trade secret, the
publisher is liable if she acquired the trade secret through "improper
means.,,3? "Improper means" include breach of contract, violation of a
confidential relationship, theft, bribery, misrepresentation and other
wrongs. 38
In general, the trade secret holder can proceed against three
categories of misappropriators.39 The first category includes employees
33 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 338, 350 (2002). C/, Bonnie L. Schriefer,
Comment, "Yelling Fire" and Hacking: Why the First Amendment Does Not Permit Distributing
Decryption Technology, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2283, 2327 (2003).
34 CAL. Cry. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 2005).
35 See Ryan Lambrecht, Note, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for
Disclosure in the Information Age? 18 Rev. Litig. 317,320-321 (1999).
36 But see Volokh, supra note 9, at 740 (restricting publication of information such as a
company's plan to release a dangerous product, while benefiting the company tends to harm the
public at large).
37 CAL.Cry. CODE § 3426.I(a) (West 2005).
38 Reverse engineering or independent derivation alone shall not be considered improper
means. CAL.Cry. CODE § 3426.I(a) (West 2005). See e.g., E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (CAS, 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1024 (1970). Improper means
could include otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the circumstances; e.g., an airplane
over flight used as aerial reconnaissance to determine the competitor's plant layout during
construction of the plant. Id.
39 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323. See also, CAL. Cry. CODE §3426.1(b) (West 2005).
"Misappropriation" means: (I) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (2) Disclosure or use of a
trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who: (A) Used improper
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had
reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was: (i) Derived from or through a
person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (iii) Derived from or through a person who owed
a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) Before a material
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bound by a duty of confidentiality arising from a contract. 40 Employees
may be held liable for misappropriation of trade secrets because they
have contracted away their First Amendment rightS. 41 An express or
implied duty of confidentiality can be enforced without offending the
First Amendment. 42
The second category includes third party misappropriators such as
competitors of trade secret holders. 43 The UTSA imposes liability when
they violate the standards of commercial ethics by hiring employees
bound by confidential agreements or inducing them to breach such
contracts. 44 Imposing liability against the defendants in the first and
second categories is justified by privity of contract, whereby publishers
are entitled to waive their First Amendment rights by contract.45
The third category includes entities such as newspapers and
websites, not in privity with the trade secret holder. 46 Journalistic
websites, like newspapers, are not in competition with trade secret
holders or bound by confidentiality agreements. 47 However, such third
parties may be liable if they knew or had reason to know at the time of
publication that the informant had acquired the information illegally.48
The grant of injunctions against this category of publishers is
troublesome in the light of the First Amendment. 49 The United States
Supreme Court refused to grant injunctions against the third party

change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. [d.
40 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323.
41 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980). The Court enforced a voluntary
confidentially agreement against CIA agent who had undertaken not to publish any material until he
had obtained the approval of the CIA. [d. Despite the agreement he published a critical book about
the CIA activities in South Viet Nam. The Court enforced the confidentiality agreement. [d.
42 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 501 U.S. 663, 669-670 (1991), Newspaper's right to
publish limited by confidentiality agreement enforceable under state contract law. [d. See also
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984), Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509
(1980) (involving the enforcement of confidentiality agreements).
43 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323. See also Microsoft Corp. v. Dr. Kai-Fu Lee and
Google Inc., No. 052235616SEA (King County Superior Court), available at
http://www.groklaw.netJarticIebasic.php?story=20050907054350872 (last visited Oct. 28, 2005)
(Microsoft filed a lawsuit against Google for hiring its senior executive in China, to head Google's
China operations).
44 Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323.
45 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 501 U.S. 663, 669-670 (1991); Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,511-513 (1980).
46 See Robert Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 Cal.
L. Rev. 241, 271(1998).
47 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 741 (2003).
48 CAL. CIY. CODE §3426.1(b) (West 2005).
49 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 741-742.
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publishers who knew or had reason to know that the information was
illegally acquired. 5o But the California Supreme Court held that
preliminary injunctions against publication by such third parties did not
violate the First Amendment. 51
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

Trade secret law is antithetical to free speech due to its enforced
secrecy.52 The UTSA is similar to other forms of intellectual property
protection in terms of encouraging innovation and protecting investments
in research and development of new technology. 53 However, unlike
other forms of intellectual property protection such as copyright, the
UTSA makes little accommodation for the First Amendment rights of the
pUblic. 54
With the growth of the Internet, disclosures of trade secrets are
increasing. 55 This has further accentuated the tension between trade
secret law and the First Amendment. 56 In resolving this conflict, the
California Supreme Court's approach in DVD Copy Control Association
v. Bunner57 ("DVDCCA "), diverges from the United States Supreme
Court's approach in New York Times v. United Sates58 ("Pentagon
Papers") and Bartnicki v. Vopper ("Bartnicki ,,).59 The California
Supreme Court favored the economic interests of the trade secret holders
in contrast to the United States Supreme Court's decisions upholding the

50 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 - 724 (1971); Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528-529 (2001).
51 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d at 86.
52 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 335. See also Whyte v. Schlage Lock Company, 101
Cal.App.4th 1443, 1454 (2002). The test for trade secrets is whether the matter sought to be
protected is information (I) which is valuable because it is unknown to others and, (2) which the
owner has attempted to keep secret. ld.
53 See Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
54 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 95 (2003). First, the UTSA lacks any
constitutional foundation. ld at 96 (2003). Second, it contains no exception for 'fair use' or any
other vehicle for safeguarding First Amendment concerns. ld.
55 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. NetCom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 923
F.Supp. 1231(N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc,. 901 F.Supp 1519 (D. Colo.
1995); RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995), DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d
69 (2003); Ford Motor Company. v. Lane 67 F.Supp.2d 745 (E.D.Mich.1999) (all involving third
party publication of trade secrets on the Internet)
56 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 335 (1999).
57 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 69 (2003).
58 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
59 532 U.S. 514 (200 I).
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First Amendment rights of publishers. 6o
A.

PENTAGON PAPERS AND THE PUBLICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION

Pentagon Papers is the seminal case establishing the right to
publish confidential information. 6' The Supreme Court's decision is
especially relevant to the discussion of the validity of preliminary
injunctions in trade secret misappropriation cases. 62
In Pentagon Papers, the Washington Post and the New York Times
published excerpts from a top secret Defense Department dossier. 63 The
document was a classified study called "History of U.S. DecisionMaking Process on Viet Nam Policy" commonly known as "The
Pentagon Papers.,,64 The newspapers acquired the documents from
Daniel Ellsberg. 65 Ellsberg stole the documents while working for the
Rand Corporation. 66 The government sought federal injunctions to
preclude the publication of the documents because of the potential
danger to national security.67
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, refused to enjoin the
newspapers from further publication of the articles. 68 The majority held
that any system of prior restraints bore a "heavy presumption against
constitutional validity" and that the government carried "a heavy burden
of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.,,69
Justice Hugo Black and Justice William Douglas categorically
stated that the "press must be free to publish news, whatever the source
without censorship, injunctions or prior restraints.,,7o They concluded
that open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national
health. 7l Justice William Brennan refused to grant the injunction, which
60 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69 (2003). Cj. New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001 (upholding the Frist
Amendment rights of third party publishers of confidential information).
61 See Greene, supra note 10, at 540.
62

[d.

63

New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.

64

[d.

65/d.
66

[d.

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714.
[d. Among six judges who voted against a prior restraint, Justices Black and Douglas
concurred in one another's opinion, as did Justices White and Stewart as to their opinions. [d.
Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion which Justices Burger and Blackmun joined. [d.
69 New York Times Co. v United States, 403 U.S. at 714.
70 See id. at 714-24. See also Samuelson, supra note 12.
71 New. York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 724.
67

68
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was "predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences
may result."n He recognized, however, that there is a single extremely
narrow class of cases in which prior restraints are permitted. 73
According to Justice Brennan, only when the nation was at war and the
proposed publication would obstruct war effort, could prior restraints be
.
d 74
Impose.
Justices Byron White and Potter Stewart, while admitting that the
documents could cause substantial damage to public interest, refused to
grant the injunction because the Government failed to meet its heavy
burden of persuading the court that the injunction was warranted under
the circumstances. 75 However, the dissenters, Chief Justice William
Burger and Justice John Harlan, pointed out that the newspapers knew at
the time of publishing the Pentagon Papers that the documents were
Nevertheless, the Pentagon Papers Court stated that
stolen. 76
preliminary injunctions should be disfavored. 77
The decision is significant, since it supports the recognition of broad
First Amendment rights for third party publishers of trade secrets. 78 The
Pentagon Papers, like trade secrets, were confidential and the newspapers
did not participate in the initial illegal acquisition, but knew or had
reason to know that Ellsberg had obtained them through improper
means. 79 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that preliminary injunctions
should be disfavored. 80
Trade secret cases involving third party publications often involve
similar facts. 8l The case is particularly significant for third party
publishers of trade secrets such as websites, because it elevates their First
Amendment right to publish confidential information over the economic
interests of trade secret holders. 82
B.

BARTNICKI AND THE RIGHT To PUBLISH CONFIDENTIAL
NEWSWORTHY INFORM ATION

The Supreme Court's decision

10

Bartnicki, further supports the

!d. at 726.
!d.
74 !d.
72
73

75

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 731.

76

[d. at 749.

[d. at 713.
See Samuelson, supra note 12.
79 See Samuelson, supra note 12.
80 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 713.
81 See Samuelson, supra note 12.
77

78

82

[d.
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rights of third party publishers of confidential information. 83 In
Bartnicki, the Court refused to grant damages for publication of
confidential information obtained in violation of a federal wiretap law. 84
An unidentified person illegally intercepted and recorded a cell phone
conversation between a union negotiator and the union president
discussing the status of collective bargaining negotiations that had
received a "lot of media attention.,,85
Defendant Vopper, a radio commentator, received a tape of the
intercepted conversation from an anonymous source. 86 He broadcasted a
portion of the conversation on radio. 87 The conversation revealed that
the union negotiator and president were plotting to blow the front
porches off the houses of persons who opposed the union. 88
The Supreme Court held that the application of the wiretap statute
to defendant Vopper violated the First Amendment, although he had
reason to know that the conversation was illegally taped. 89 The Court
noted that the government had a strong interest in enforcing the law that
preserves the privacy of communications. 9o Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that "[t]he enforcement of the [statutes at issue] implicates the
core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on
the publication of truthful information of public concern. ,.9l Thus, the
Court held that "privacy concerns have to give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.,,92
The Supreme Court's decisions in Pentagon Papers and Bartnicki
have a limited impact on trade secret cases because (1) the UTSA
expressly authorizes the grant of preliminary injunctions in trade secret
misappropriation cases, but Pentagon Papers did not address the effect
of such a statute, 93 and (2) in Bartnicki, the Supreme Court itself
declined to extend its holding to "disclosures of trade secrets or domestic
gossip or other information of purely private concern.,,94
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
1d.
85 1d.
86 1d.
87 1d. at 519.
88 1d .
89 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. at 533.
90 [d. at 532.
91 [d. at 533.
92 Id. at 534.
93 See
Samuelson, supra note 12. [I]mpact of Pentagon Papers on trade secret cases is
limited by the lack of a majority opinion and the lack of legislative authority for enjoining the press
from publishing confidential information.
94 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
83

84
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C.

THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S ApPROACH To THIRD PARTY
PUBLICATION OF TRADE SECRETS

The California Supreme Court's decision in DVD Copy Control
Association v. Bunner ("DVDCCA") examined the conflict between the
First Amendment rights of third party publishers and the economic
interests of the trade secret holders. 95 The court placed the economic
interests of the trade secret holders above the First Amendment rights of
third party publishers and held that the preliminary injunctions were
justified in protecting the economic interests of trade secret holders. 96
DVDCCA held the trade secret rights in the Content Scramble
System (CSS), an encryption program, used to protect DVD movies. 97
DVDCCA's licensees were required to install CSS in their systems,
undertake various security measures to ensure that CSS remained secret,
and include in end-user licenses provisions that forbid end-users from
reverse-engineering CSS. 98 Notwithstanding these efforts to keep CSS
secret, a teenager named Jon Johansen allegedly reverse engineered CSS
in Norway.99 Johansen wrote a program, DeCSS, that bypassed CSS and
posted the DeCSS on the Internet. lOo In late October 1999, this program
was the subject of intense discussion at various Internet sites. 101
Numerous participants, including Andrew Bunner, decided to post this
program on their websites. 102
After Bunner and others ignored cease-and-desist letters, DVDCCA
sued in California state court.103 DVDCCA charged Bunner, twenty
other named individuals, and five hundred John Doe defendants, with
trade secrecy misappropriation on the ground that Bunner and the other
defendants knew or should have known that DeCSS embodied or was
substantially derived from stolen trade secrets. 104 The trial court issued a
preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from posting or
otherwise disclosing the DeCSS program and any other information
95 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 75 (2003). See also, Samuelson,
supra note 12.
96 DVD Copy Control Ass'n" 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 75 (2003).
97 ld.
98 ld.
99 ld.
100
101

Id. at 76.
ld.

102 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 76. See also Samuelson. supra note
12. They posted this program as part of a widespread protest against the motion picture industry's
efforts to prevent dissemination of this program. Id.
103 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 78.
104 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 338, 340.
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derived from DVDCCA's proprietary information. lOS
On appeal, the California Supreme Court assumed as true the trial
court's findings in support of the preliminary injunction.106 The court
assumed that - (1) DVDCCA would prevail on its claims (2) DVDCCA
would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief and, (3) The
injunction would cause minimal harm to Bunner. 107
The court found that the preliminary injunction was content
neutral 108 and hence, not a prior restraint, because prior restraints must be
content-based. 109 The court conceded that DeCSS, although computer
code, was expression and therefore protected speech. 110 The court, after
claiming to extend First Amendment protection to computer code, only
considered whether the UTSA was engaged in viewpoint-based
restriction. III Once the court concluded the UTSA was not suppressing a
particular viewpoint, it showed no concern with whether the regulation
was nevertheless a content-based restriction. 112 It simply refused to look
at the nature of what was being suppressed by the UTSA, and in the
name of protecting property rights adopted intermediate scrutiny. 113
Moreover, the court failed to consider that even if the UTSA is content
neutral, a specific preliminary injunction issued under the UTSA is not

Id.
106 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 79.
105

107/d.
108 See Sable Communications of Cal ifomia, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The first
step in the court's First Amendment analysis involves a determination by the court of whether the
restriction on expression is content based. Id. See also Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The New Software
Jurisprudence and the Faltering First Amendment, 6 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 310, 318 (2004.)
Content based restrictions prohibit expression the basis of subject matter, and at their broadest they
prohibit discussion of an issue altogether. Id. Viewpoint based restrictions, while also content based,
and prohibit expression of one viewpoint on a subject while allowing another. /d. Both content based
and view point based are subject to the highest level of scrutiny - strict scrutiny. Id. If a measure is
deemed not to be content based or is deemed to be content neutral, then the restriction will usually
be adjudicated under a lower less exacting level of scrutiny-intermediate scrutiny. Id. Strict scrutiny
requires the government to establish it has a compelling interest in the restriction and it has adopted
means narrowly tailored to meet that object. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government's
interest be substantial and the restriction not burden more speech than necessary. Id.
109 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 80.
110 Id. "Computer code 'is an expressive means for the exchange of information ... we join
the other courts that have concluded that computer code, and computer programs constructed from
code can merit First Amendment protection.'" [d.
III Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The New Software Jurisprudence and the Faltering First
Amendment, 6 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 310, 318 (2004). The court actually applied an even less
exacting test than intermediate level - something on the order of rational basis, in which any burden
on the government is slight. Id.
112
Id.
1\3 Id.
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content neutral. 114
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the
government had a significant interest in protecting the investment of
trade secret holders in developing new and innovative products. 115
Therefore, third party publishers' First Amendment rights must give way
to the government's interests served by the preliminary injunction. I 16
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected several decisions
holding that preliminary injunctions were unconstitutional even when the
The court reasoned that
publication involved a trade secret. I 17
DVDCCA's trade secrets in the CSS technology in the form of computer
code conveyed only technical information (emphasis in original). I 18 The
information was of interest to only a small niche group of Linux users
and not the general pUblic. 119 Although, the computer code constituted
expressive content, the court found that, in posting the information,
Bunner did not intend to participate in any public debate or comment on
any public issue.l20 Consequently, the information addressed matters of
purely private concern. 121
The court also concluded that the computer code was not
newsworthy because there was no logical nexus between the trade secret
the computer code represented, and public interest. 122 It determined that
DVDCCA's trade secrets may have some link to a public issue.123
However, this fact was insufficient for creating a legitimate public
interest in their disclosure. 124 On balance, the court found that the
government interest in protecting the property rights of the trade secret

114 See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe. 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (holding that a prior
restraint comes with a " 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity. ").
115 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 83.
116 [d. at 87.
117 !d. See Oregon ex rei. Sports Mgmt. News v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304 (1996). Adidas
had persuaded a lower court to issue the injunction to prevent Sports Management News from
publishing reports about a new shoe design which Adidas claimed as a trade secret. !d. However,
the Oregon Supreme Court overturned a preliminary injunction. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67
F.Supp.2d 745 (1999).(E.D.Mich.1999). Ford Motor Co. lost a motion for a preliminary injunction
on First Amendment grounds against Internet postings about unreleased new automobile designs that
Ford claimed as trade secrets. [d. However, the California Supreme Court found these decisions
inapplicable.
118 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 86.
119

[d.

120

[d.

121

!d.

J22
123

DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 86.
!d. at 79.

124

[d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 5

232

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

holder outweighed Bunner's interest in publication. 125
The court did leave open the possibility for a narrow exception to
grant of preliminary injunctions against third party publishers. 126 The
court's decision seems to suggest that the court would not have granted
the injunction if the information published related to a matter of public
concern and was newsworthy.127 Therefore, if Bunner's posting (1) had
mass appeal; (2) contributed to any public debate or commented on any
public issue, and (3) was newsworthy, then the court may not have
granted the injunction. 128
IV. THE FEATURES OF A "NEWSWORTHY PUBLIC CONCERN
EXCEPTION" To THE GRANT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

The issue of third party pUblication of trade secrets has also arisen
in the context of Apple's lawsuits against websites and their operators. 129
Apple's lawsuits provide an opportunity to examine the factors for an
exception to the grant of preliminary injunctions. As Apple's lawsuits
demonstrate, newsworthiness or mass appeal of a piece of information is
necessary but not sufficient for an exception to the grant of preliminary
injunctions. 130 The information must also affect a matter of public
concern, namely the health, safety, or well being of the people at large. 131
Therefore, when a trade secret stimulates the interest or curiosity of the
public and affects public concern, then preliminary injunctions should
not be imposed on the third party publishers of the information. 132 The
Id. at 87.
See id. at 86.
127
1d.
125

126

128 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 86. See also DVD Copy Control
Ass'n v. Bunner, to Cal.Rptr.3d 185 (2004). The California Supreme remanded the case to the Court
of Appeal which struck down the injunction as an unconstitutional prior restraint. /d. at 195. The
Court of Appeal concluded that the DeCSS had lost its status as a trade secret prior to the initiation
of lawsuit. Id. In addition, defendant Bunner had only republished infonnation already available on
other sites. Id. at 190. The Court of Appeal concluded that: (1) DVDCCA could not show that it
would suffer irreparable hann before obtaining injunction; (2) DVDCCA did not show likelihood of
prevailing on merits; and (3) DVDCCA failed to show irreparable hann if injunction were not
issued. Id. at 192-96. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the order granting preliminary
injunction. Id. at 195.
129 See, ThinkSecret, Complaint. See also Apple Does, Complaint.
130 See Judge Kleinberg, March II, 2005, Order after Hearing supra note 19, at 12.
131
1d.
132 See generally Volokh,
supra note 9 at 741 (imposing restrictions on third party
publication of trade secrets which relate to matters of public concern is a violation of First
Amendment). See also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049, t071
(2000) (suggesting a hot news exception as a solution to restrictions on First Amendment rights
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existence of both factors, newsworthiness and public concern, would
contribute to protecting the First Amendment rights of third party
publishers and welfare of the public at large without indiscriminately
. trade secrets. 1D
exposmg
A.

ApPLE'S LAWSUITS AGAINST WEBSITES FOR PUBLICATION OF
TRADE SECRETS

Apple filed two lawsuits, both involving the third party disclosure
of trade secrets on the Internet. 134 Apple filed a lawsuit against several
unnamed defendants for posting an exact copy of a detailed drawing of
"Asteroid" created by Apple. 135 The drawing was taken from a
confidential set of slides clearly labeled "Apple-Need-to-Know
Confidential.,,136 In addition, "technical specifications were copied
verbatim from confidential slide set and posted on the Internet.,,137
Apple subpoenaed three websites, Apple Insider, PowerPage and
ThinkSecret, to produce their confidential sources. 138 In permitting the
discovery of confidential sources, the trial court held that trade secret law
applies to everyone regardless of their status, title, or chosen
profession. 139 The court also held that the compelling interest in
protecting trade secrets outweighed any First Amendment rights of the
websites. 14o As a result, the court concluded that verbatim posting of the
information served no public interest and denied the protective order
sought by the websites. 141 The trial court reasoned that "an interested
public is not the same as public interest.,,142
In another lawsuit against the website ThinkSecret, Apple sought
preliminary and permanent injunctions and damages for the publication
of its future product information. 143 ThinkSecret printed three articles
about the headless iMAC and iWork office suite prior to the actual
announcement to the public at the IMac Exhibition. l44 Although the
based on information privacy.)
133 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 745-46.

See Apple Does. Complaint and ThinkSecret. Complaint.
Judge Kleinberg. March 11, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19. at 6.
136 /d at 2-3.
137 [d.
138 [d.

134

135

139
140

See id. at 8-9.
See id. at 11-12.

141/d.
142

[d at 12.

ThinkSecret. Complaint, supra note 3, at 18.
144 [d.
143
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website obtained the information from an anonymous source, Apple
alleged that the information was obtained through improper means. 145
Thus, Apple's second lawsuit also involved the third party publication of
trade secrets!46 In all probability, the trial court's decision will be
similar to its decision in Apple's first lawsuit. 147
B.

THE FEATURES OF A "NEWSWORTHY PUBLIC CONCERN
EXCEPTION"

The trial court in Apple's case stated that "an interested public is not
the same as public interest.,,148 This statement warrants further
discussion about the features of a "newsworthy public concern
exception".149 First, the exception cannot be applied if the third party is
also involved in the initial misappropriation of the trade secret. 150 Such a
limitation on the application of the exception is necessary to ensure
efficiency of the creative processes of trade secret holders. 151 Second,
the information must be newsworthy.152 Finally, the information must
affect the welfare of the general public. 153
Reliance on the
newsworthiness of the information, without more, would be as harmful
to the public as a policy of prohibiting disclosure in all situations. 154
1.

Public-Concern - A Tort Law Analogy

In applying the "newsworthy public concern exception" exception
the courts would benefit from tort law cases where a "public necessity"
exception is used to resolve the conflict between the property rights of
private parties and welfare of the pUblic. 155

145

[d.

146

[d.

147 See John Gruber, On The Credibility of the New York Times,
available at:
hnp:/ldaringfireball.net/2005/03/new_york_times (last visited Oct. 28, 2005)
148 See Judge Kleinberg, March 11, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19, at 12.
149

[d.

150

See Samuelson, supra note 12.
See id.

151

See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 87.
See Volokh, supra note 132 at 741.
154 See. Judge Kleinberg, March ]], 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19, at 11-12.
155 See Bone, supra note 46, at 271. Not only is trade secret law classified with other
intellectual property laws, but trade secrets themselves are treated as property capable of free
transfer and devise. [d. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-28 (1987) (finding that
confidential information is "property" for purposes of a criminal conviction under the federal mail
and wire fraud statute); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (holding that
trade secrets are "property" for purposes of the Constitution's prohibition against takings without just
152
153

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss2/5

16

Murthy: Preliminary Injunctions in Trade Secrets

2006] PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS & TRADE SECRETS 235
Tort law recognizes a public-concern exception even where the
interests of a private party are significantly affected. 156 In Surroco v.
Geary, the California Supreme Court recognized the concept of "public
necessity." 157 The plaintiff's house was blown up to prevent the spread
of fire that would have destroyed several other properties on the block. 158
In refusing to award damages the court held that "the individual rights of
property give way to the higher laws of impending necessity.,,159
Similarly, in defamation cases the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a
public concern exception to the common law rule not requiring the
private plaintiff to show actual malice. l60 The Court found that the First
Amendment requires a higher burden of proof when the plaintiff seeks to
enjoin the media defendant from publishing information of public
concem. 161 Likewise, the individual property rights of trade secret
holders must give way to the greater need of the public in certain
situations.
2.

Third Party Involvement In The Initial Misappropriation Of The
Trade Secret Vitiates The Application Of The Exception

As stated, the UTSA permits injunctions and damages against third
party publishers if they knew or had reason to know that the information
was obtained illegally.162 In DVDCCA, the California Supreme Court
equated such publishers to receivers of stolen property.163 The rationale
is to prevent the "laundering" of misappropriated information. l64 If a
third party were not also held liable, a misappropriator would attempt to
publicize the information by disclosing it to third parties. 165 Once the
information is widely disclosed, the information is no longer a trade
secret and the misappropriator could thus insulate himself from

compensation); See also Surroco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853) (establishing the doctrine of public
necessity).
156 See Surroco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
157 [d. at 73.
158 [d. at 70.
159 [d. at 73.
160 See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (l964)(holding that in cases
involving matters of public concern, the private plaintiff must prove actual malice by a clear and
convincing evidence to succeed.)
161/d.

CAL. CIv. CODE §3426.I(b) (West 2(05).
DVD Copy Control Assn. v. Bunner, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 86 (2003).
164 Samuelson, supra note 12.
162

163

165

[d.
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liability. 166 If the third party were also held liable, the incentive to
rapidly disseminate the trade secret is abated. 167
In Bartnicki,168 as in Pentagon Papers l69 before it, the United States
Supreme Court refused to hold the third party publisher liable, even
though the publisher knew or had reason to know that the information
was obtained illegally.l70 In DVDCCA, the California Supreme Court
erroneously assumed that website operator Bunner knew or had reason to
know that the information was a trade secret. 171 Still, the court correctly
focused its main inquiry on the constitutionality of the preliminary
injunction.172 The court considered whether there was sufficient public
interest in publication so as to preclude the preliminary injunction. 173
Like Bartnicki,174 D VDCCA does not hold a third party publisher liable
simply because the publisher knew or had reason to know that the
information was a result of a breach of duty. 175 So long as the third party
publisher was not involved in initial misappropriation, the fact that the
publisher knew or had reason to know should not restrict the application
of the newsworthy- public-concern exception. 176
3.

Information With A Logical Nexus To Public Interest Is Newsworthy

In DVDCCA, the court also stated that "the publication of private
information is only newsworthy if there is a logical nexus between the
information and a matter of legitimate public interest.,,177 In addition to
the requirement that the information not be "generally known," which
arguably makes it newsworthy, the content must also involve an issue of
public concern. 178
What constitutes "public concern" is difficult to define. 179 In
166/d.
167

[d.

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 515 (2001).
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
170 See supra notes 61-92 and accompanying text.
171 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 79; see also DVD Copy Control Ass'n v.
Bunner, 116 Cal. App.4th 241 (2004) (On remand. the Court of Appeal found that since CSS code
was widely available even before Bunner published it on his website, he was not guilty of
misappropriating the DVDCCA's trade secret.)
172 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d at 79.
173 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
174 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at SIS.
175 See supra note 128 and accompanying text
176 See Volokh, supra note 132, at 743.
177 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 84.
178 See Volokh, supra note 132, at 741.
179 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 743.
168

169
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Apple's lawsuit against ThinkSecret, the posting of infonnation
concerning Apple's new products did not meet the exception. 180
Although infonnation about new products was newsworthy, it did not
meet the public concern element. 181 The aim of the posting was to satisfy
the curiosity of the public concerning new products rather than to
contribute to a discussion of an issue of public importance,182 therefore,
the "newsworthy public concern exception" would not apply.
Likewise, in DVDCCA the court dismissed the publication of
DeCSS as a matter of private concern of interest only to computer
encryption enthusiasts. 183 However, the court's conception of what
constitutes matters of public concern is flawed. 184 Characterizing trade
secrets as relating to matters of "purely private concern" is erroneous. 185
Trade secrets can often be matters of significant public concern to a
company's employee, customers, neighbors, or regulators. 186 The court's
dictum would lead to a ban on third party publication of trade secrets
based on an unsupported assertion of their inherent "private concern"
status. 187
The court's notion of public concern would necessarily exclude
This
scientific infonnation published in scientific journals. 188
infonnation would garner less protection because it is merely of private
concern and would only appeal to a select group of computer
scientists. 189
The court would similarly hold that infonnation concerning a
vaccine for AIDS or cancer that stems from a trade secret is not entitled
to protection under a public concern exception, despite the tremendous
public necessity for the infonnation, because the infonnation is technical
and would appeal only to biologists. 190
A determination of the public concern element clearly depends on
the facts of each case and courts should not be too quick to dismiss
product and technical infonnation as lacking public concern. 191 A
discussion of purely scientific issues is of no less public concern than a
See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
See Judge Kleinberg, March 11, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19, at 11-12.
IS2 'd.
ISO
lSI

IS3
IS4

DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 86.
See Volokh. supra note 9, at 743.

IS5

'd.

IS6

!d.

IS7

'd.

ISS

'd. at 746.

IS9

!d.

190

'd.

191

Id.
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discussion of politics, because scientific and political issues are often
interrelated. 192 Therefore, a balanced approach is important in the
interest of equity because preliminary injunctions are pretrial relief and,
if granted liberally, may morph into prior restraints. 193
IV. RATIONALE FOR A "NEWSWORTHY PUBLIC CONCERN EXCEPTION"
FOR THIRD PARTY PuBLICATION OF TRADE SECRETS

The recognition of a "newsworthy public concern exception" to
trade secret law is important for several reasons. Preliminary injunctions
are granted before the trade secret holder can establish that the
information is indeed a trade secret. 194 Consequently, the court in
granting injunctions may be suppressing potentially protected speech
based on "surmise and conjecture.,,195 Injunctions are an easy tool for
trade secret holders who want to prevent certain negative information
about their products from reaching the public. 196Through the devices of
preliminary injunctions trade secret holders can suppress the views of
third party publishers, throttle a source of information, and keep the
public ignorant about information affecting their welfare.
A
newsworthy- public-concern exception is necessary to prevent trade
secret holders from controlling the content and flow of certain
information on the Internet.
A.

REDUCING THE CHILLING EFFECT OF TRADE SECRET LAW ON
EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Preliminary injunctions have a definite chilling effect on speech
because they are granted before a full trial on the merits. 197 The special
vice of a preliminary injunction is that it is a prior restraint and
suppresses communication, either directly or indirectly, by inducing
excessive caution in the speaker. 198 Consequently, potentially protected
speech will be enjoined prior to adjudication on the merits of the
192

1d.

See supra note 108-109 and accompanying text.
See generally Bone, supra note 46, at 271. (arguing that trade secret law is justified only
when it protects pre-patent information).
195 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
196 See CAL CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2005). Senate Legislative Committee Comments,
Added by Stats.1984, c. 1724, § I. Amended by Stats.1994, c. 1010 (S.B.2053), § 54.
197 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d, 69, 93 (2003) (Moreno, J.,
concurring).
198 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. The Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973).
193
194
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publisher's First Amendment claims. 199
Moreover, injunctions against publication of information
concerning new products have the effect of keeping consumers in the
dark about these new products and technologies?OO Information such as
defects in the products, potential effects of using drugs, a comparison of
new products to existing products, policies concerning the marketing of
these products to particular groups of people such as children, warnings
about negative effects, etc., are of significance to the public and should
not be suppressed?OI
Injunctions against third party publishers that provide the public
with such information smother discussion, comment, criticism, and
debate?02 Courts should not become accessories of big corporations that
want to avoid bad publicity by controlling the product or technology
information under the rubric of trade secret. In particular, small website
publishers will be susceptible to corporations' demand to remove, or
In considering
even refrain from posting the information?03
corporations' pretrial requests to compel websites to remove any
"offending" messages, courts should if possible avoid granting
preliminary injunctions in favor of awarding damages after trial. 204
Apple, for instance routinely sends "cease-and-desist" letters to
websites and their Internet Service Provider ("ISP") when they believe
that certain proprietary information has been disclosed on the Internet. 205
For example, in July 2000, MacInTouch published rumors regarding
upcoming Apple products set to be announced at that summer's
Macworld Expo in New York. 206 Apple Legal sent a cease-and-desist

199 Id. See also Lemley & Volokh, Free Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property
Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 158-164, 216-224 (1998) (arguing that an important purpose of prior
restraint doctrine should be curtailing premature censorship of potentially protected speech through
preliminary injunctions); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role o/the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 Va. L. Rev. 53, 87-88 (1984) (arguing that the prior restraint doctrine
recognizes that interim equitable relief poses a particular danger to First Amendment rights.)
200 See generally Volokh, supra note 9; Greene, supra note 10.
201 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 746.
202 See id.
203 See
John
Gruber,
Plugged
Leaks,
available
at:
http://daringfireball.netJ2005/07/plugged_leaks (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
204 See Greene, supra note 10.
205 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. When a rumor site publishes screenshots of
unreleased Apple software, Apple's lawyers send a friendly cease-and-desist letter: "Take down
these images, and we'll call it even. " /d. These cease-and-desist letters are such a regular occurrence
that they've turned into an unofficial gauge of accuracy - if a rumor is posted with screenshots of
unreleased Apple software, and the site does not receive a letter from Apple Legal, then the images
are widely regarded as fakes. Id.
206 Id.
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letter, demanding the site remove the information and also sent a letter to
MacInTouch's ISP. 207 The website complied with Apple's request solely
to avoid the legal cost of fighting it. 208
Similarly, Apple sent several "cease-and-desist" letters to
ThinkSecert before filing their lawsuit?09 The successful application of a
preliminary injunction against ThinkSecret enables Apple to send a
strong message to other such websites posting information about their
products. 2lO The effect is that websites, unwilling to pursue litigation,
will comply merely because Apple claimed that the information was a
trade secret. 2l1
Thus, trade secret holders have the power, inside and outside the
courtroom, to control the content and flow of information concerning
their product.
A "newsworthy public concern exception" would
significantly diminish the effect of such cease-and-desist letters and
prevent trade secret holders from censoring content on the Internet.
B.

PREVENTING THE SUPPRESSION OF THE THIRD PARTY PUBLISHER'S
VIEWPOINT

In DVDCCA, the California Supreme Court concluded that the
injunctive remedy granted under trade secret law is content neutral. 212
Generally, preliminary injunctions can suppress the viewpoint of third
party publishers. 213 Specifically, trade secret holders can constrain or
eliminate information that would unpredictably affect the demand for
their products, before actual release, through preliminary injunctions?14
The injunctions thus enable corporations to shape information or its
content in a most advantageous way at a most convenient time.215 While
the trade secret holders' investments are protected, the interests of the
public and third party publishers are compromised. 216
In DVDCCA, the court stated that the injunction would not hamper
Bunner's ability to "discuss and debate" the issues in "an educational,
scientific, philosophical and political context.,,217 However, technical
207

[d.

208/d.
209

210

ThinkSecret, Complaint, supra note 3, at II.
See Gruber, supra note 203.

211/d.
212
213

DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69, 88 (2003).
SeeVolokh, supra note 9, at 746.

214/d.
215/d.

216/d.
217

DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 87.
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information is often expressed in a particular format - in code, data,
figures, and formulae. 218 An effective discussion would be hampered if
the third party was precluded from using those forms of expressions to
.
'd
219
communIcate
1 eas.
A "newsworthy public concern exception" would help correct the
imbalance favoring the rights of trade secret holders and, at the same
time, preserve the right of the public to monitor an organization's
practices, policies and the quality of their products and services,z20
Arguably, publication of Apple's future product information failed
to meet the public concern element. 221 While the public was certainly
"interested" in the information, the "interest" was mere curiosity.222
Moreover, the disclosure did not affect the welfare of the public. 223
On the other hand, publication of the negative effects of a drug
suppressed by a trade secret holder would qualify for the "newsworthy
public concern exception". Pharmaceutical companies often market
drugs, with significant side effects, directly to consumers.224 For
instance, during the recent Vioxx trials in Texas, it was revealed that
Merck's executives knew that Vioxx increased the risk of cardiac arrests
as early as 1997, but continued to aggressively market the drug as safe. 225
The public would benefit from information about the harmful
effects of drugs or the illegal promotion of drugs for unauthorized
uses,226 but, the UTSA and the FDA regulations enable drug companies
to withhold information affecting the health of people under the guise of
trade secrets. 227 The expansive definition of "trade secrets" adopted by
the UTSA extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an

Vo1okh, supra note 9 at 741.
1d.
220 !d.
218

219

221

See Judge Kleinberg, March Il, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 124, at 11-12.

222

!d. at 12.

223

!d. at 13.

See
Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug Companies, available at:
http://www.nybooks.comlarticlesl17244#fn3 (last visited Sept. 17,2(05).
225 See Anna W. Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Leaked Documents Show Merck Knew of
Vioxx Dangers, available at: http://www.newstarget.comlOI613.html(lastvisitedNov.IS. 2005).
224

226

!d.

See Was Traci Johnson Driven to Suicide by Anti-Depressants? That's a Trade Secret, Say
THE
INDEPENDENT
(London),
June
19,
2005,
available
at
US
Officials,
http://news.independent.co.ukluklhealth_medicallarticle226432.ece; But cf Protecting Trade Secrets
and Other Intellectual Property in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, Rx for the Defense, Winter
2004, Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe available at LEXIS, News Library (arguing that such protection
is necessary to foster investment in research and development and prevent competitors from
plagiarizing technology.)
227
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opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to use.228 The
definition includes information that has commercial value from a
negative viewpoint, such as the results of lengthy and expensive research
which proves that a certain process will not work and which could be of
. 229
great vaIue to a competItor.
Recognition of a "newsworthy public concern exception" is
necessary in such situations because of the vital importance of the
disclosure. 23o While the disclosure may cause significant losses to the
pharmaceutical company, the public's concern about the information
outweighs the purely commercial interests in retaining the information as
a trade secret. 231
Even where the publication of proprietary information would cause
significant loss to companies, courts have refused to enjoin publication
of such information in traditional media when it relates to a matter of
public concern.232 In CBS, Inc. v. Davis, the United States Supreme
Court reversed a district court decision granting a preliminary injunction
prohibiting CBS from airing video footage taken at the factory of Federal
Beef Processors, Inc. 233 The district court granted the injunction because
the tape disclosed the company's "confidential and proprietary practices
and processes.,,234 In striking down the injunction, Justice Blackmun
held that the transmission addressed a matter of public concern and the
injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. 235
The same standard set forth in CBS should apply to Apple's case
against ThinkSecret. If the public's interest in Apple's new products is
mere curiosity, then publication of the information that constitutes that
trade secret should be properly enjoined, even though it is newsworthy.
236 On the other hand, if the public concern is sufficiently great, then the
court should apply the "newsworthy public concern exception" and deny
the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

228 CAL Cry. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2005). Senate Legislative Committee Comments. Added by
Stats.1984, c. 1724, § I. Amended by Stats.1994, c. \0\0 (S.B.2053), § 54.
229
1d.
230 See Vo1okh, supra note 9, at 748.
231
1d.
232 See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713,714 (1971); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper. 532 U.S.
514,515 (2001).
233 CBS. Inc. v. Davis, 5\0 U.S. 1315, 1325 (1994).
234 Id.
235
1d.

236

See Judge Kleinberg, March 11.2005. Order after Hearing. supra note 19, at 12.
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C.

PREVENTING CONCEALMENT OF INFORMATION AFFECTING PUBLIC
CONCERN

Article I of the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the
power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." 237 Other forms of intellectual
property rights such as patent and copyright expire after a definite period
of time. 238
In addition, copyright law recognizes a "fair use
exception.,,239
In contrast, the UTSA lacks a constitutional foundation and fails to
make any accommodation for the First Amendment rights of third party
publishers?40 The law makes no exception for the disclosure of
information under any circumstances?41 Furthermore, it permits the trade
secret holder to keep the information secret indefinitely, thereby
depriving the public from accessing the information forever. 242
The classic trade secret example is the formula for making CocaCola. 243 Critics of a public concern exception cite the losses that CocaCola would sustain if its formula were disclosed,z44 In fact, Coca-Cola is
a good example for the recognition of a newsworthy- public-concern
exception. "The original Coca-Cola was a late-nineteenth-century
concoction known as Pemberton's French Wine Coca, a mixture of

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
Utility patents and plant patents expire 20 years from the date of filing of the earliest
to
the
payment
of
maintenance
fees.
application
subject
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pacldoclgenerallindex.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). Design
patents last 14 years from the date of issuance. Trademarks expire 10 years after the registration with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. Copyright terms vary from 28 to 120 years
depending on the date of publication of the work. Id.
239 The 'fair use' exception permits copying and use of a copyrighted work 'for purposes such
as criticism. comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research' under certain
circumstances. 17 U.S.c. § 107. It 'offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder with the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern,
such as art, science and industry. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69, 96 (2003).
Injunctions in copyright infringement cases have been upheld 'on the ground that First Amendment
concerns are protected by and coextensive with the [Copyright Act's] fair use doctrine.' Id.
240 DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 338, 349.
241 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 96.
242 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d at 350.
243 See Atkins, supra note IS, at 1152.
244 Id. A corporation suffers the same harm as individuals; in fact, corporations may have
much more to lose than individuals. The damage to individuals is often temporary, whereas a
corporation may suffer permanent damage from appropriation of its identity if its trade secret is lost
on the Internet. Consider, for instance, the damage that Coca-Cola would suffer if its secret formula
were published on the Internet and others were free to appropriate it. !d.
237
238
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alcohol, the caffeine-rich kola nut, and coca, the raw ingredient of
cocaine.,,245 Due to public pressure the cocaine content was dropped in
1903?46 Despite the change in one of its essential ingredients, CocaCola continued to thrive?47
If the formula for Coca-Cola were never revealed, then the public
would never have known that the drink contained cocaine and could
never have forced Coca-Cola to remove the harmful ingredient.
Therefore, the "newsworthy public concern exception" is necessary for
formulating policies and passing laws to protect the public from harmful
practices that companies would indulge in to maximize their profits.
While information is eventually disclosed to the public under patent
and copyright law, a trade secret keeps valuable information from the
public for an indefinite period. 248 For example, the UTSA enables an oil
company that has developed an alternative source of energy to
deliberately suppress that information to capitalize on its profits from oil
and natural gas?49 If disclosed, the information would probably be of
great benefit to the public?50 The company derives profit from keeping
this information secret and the UTSA permits the company to conceal
this information indefinitely, or until it decides the time is right to exploit
the information.25I The UTSA also permits the company to seek
injunctions against third party publishers who reveal this information to
the pUblic.252
In such situations, a "newsworthy public concern exception" would
enable the public to force law makers to develop policies or provide
subsidies for exploiting technology to ease the dependence on traditional
fossil fuels. The absence of this exception benefits the trade secret
holder at the cost of the society in general. Thus, the secrecy that benefits
the holder engenders great social cost at the expense of others. A
"newsworthy public concern exception" that allows the publication of
trade secrets helps to diminish the negative effects of such secrecy.

245 See
articles from
the
New Yorker,
http://www.gladwell.com/200112001_07_30_ajava.htm.
246 Id.
247
1d.

July

30,

2001,

available

at:

See supra notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
See Volokh, supra note 9, at 747.
250
1d.
251 See CAL CIv. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2005). Senate Legislative Committee Comments.
Added by Stats.1984, c. 1724, § I. Amended by Stats.1994, c. 1010 (S.B.2053), § 54.
252
1d.
248
249
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V.

CONCLUSION

The "newsworthy public concern exception" is justified by the
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open .... ,,253 The UTSA,
however, inhibits this debate by adopting an expansive definition of trade
secret, encompassing a wide range of information and permitting trade
secret holders to keep information secret forever. 254 Trade secret law
also authorizes the issuance of preliminary injunctions for unauthorized
disclosures of trade secrets. 255 Preliminary injunctions issued after an
abbreviated judicial inquiry further aggravate the inhibiting effect of
trade secret law. 256
The application of these injunctions against third party publishers
such as websites, are a violation of their First Amendment rights.257 The
injunctions are not justified even when the third party publishers knew or
had reason to know that the information was a trade secret because they
are not in privity with the trade secret holder and owe no duty of
secrecy.258
A "newsworthy public concern exception" to the grant of
preliminary injunctions against such third party publishers is necessary to
protect their First Amendment rights?59 The exception is also necessary
for the welfare of the general public because it brings to light negative
information deliberately suppressed by a trade secret holder. 26o A
"newsworthy public concern exception" also enables the public to
monitor the activities of companies and to develop policies for the
greater good of society?61
The cost of recognizing the exception would be borne by trade
secret holders?62 To ensure that the interests of trade secret holders are
not jeopardized, the exception must be applied only when a third party
publisher was not complicit in the initial misappropriation. 263 Moreover
the exception may be applied only where the information published is

New York
See supra
255 See supra
256 See supra
257 See supra
258 See supra
259 See supra
260 See supra
261 See supra
262 See supra
263 See id.
253

254
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Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
note 18 and accompanying text.
notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
note 39-51and accompanying text.
notes 52-92 and accompanying text.
note 197-211 and accompanying text.
note 237-252 and accompanying text.
note 212-236 and accompanying text.
notes 162-176 and accompanying text.
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both newsworthy and affects public concern?64
Therefore a "newsworthy public concern exception" to the grant of
preliminary injunctions against third party publishers of trade secrets is
justified both by the publishers' right to publish and the public's need to
know.

SAHANA MURTHY

264
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